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Abstract States have captured the imagination of international legal scholars, to the
extent that for a variety of non-state actors (NSAs), statehood may appear to be the
ultimate prize. This contribution sheds some light on how the epistemic community
has come to venerate the state as the structural embodiment of politico-legal order,
as ‘the hero’ in international law narratives and how, nevertheless, NSAs have been
allowed to carve out a space for themselves. It is argued that in spite of NSAs’
gradual emancipation, to this very day, the presence of the state continues to loom
large in discussions on international legal subjectivity.
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1 Introduction
Philip Alston originally coined the ‘not-a-cat’ syndrome to describe how we look at
non-state actors (NSAs): as being characterized by what they are not—namely
states—rather than by what they are.1 States have indeed captured the imagination,
Cedric Ryngaert is a member of the Board of Editors of the Netherlands International Law Review. The
author appreciates the financial support from the European Research Council (Proposal 336230—
UNIJURIS) and the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (No. 016.135.322). This contribution is
based on a keynote speech which the author delivered at the biennial meeting (theme: non-state actors)
of the British Branch of the International Law Association at Lancaster University, 8 April 2016, and at a
seminar on ‘A State-Centred International Legal System’, at Maastricht University, 27 May 2016.
& Cedric Ryngaert
C.M.J.Ryngaert@uu.nl
1 Professor of Public International Law, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
1 Alston (2005).
123
Neth Int Law Rev (2016) 63:183–195
DOI 10.1007/s40802-016-0062-1
to the extent that for a variety of NSAs, statehood may appear to be the ultimate
prize, the nec plus ultra of being taken seriously in the international community.2 In
this short contribution, drawing on my experience as a rapporteur of the
International Law Association’s Committee on Non-State Actors (2008–2014), I
shed some light on how our epistemic community has come to venerate the state as
the structural embodiment of politico-legal order, as ‘the hero’ in international law
narratives (Sect. 2)—and how, nevertheless, NSAs have been allowed to carve out a
space for themselves (Sect. 3). Subsequently, I will give a bird’s eye view of NSAs’
extant rights (Sect. 4) and obligations (Sect. 5) under international law, i.e., the
scope of their international legal personality. I will argue that in spite of NSAs’
gradual emancipation, to this very day, the presence of the state—as the gatekeeper
of the international legal system and the circle of relevant international legal
subjects—continues to loom large in discussions on international legal subjectivity
(Sect. 6). In this contribution, I focus in particular on organized non-state
collectivities, such as non-governmental organizations, corporations, and armed
groups. I pay only marginal attention to individuals and intergovernmental
organizations.
2 Monoglossia: The State as the Hero of International Law
Hero worship is not unique to the law. It speaks to a deep human desire to identify
one entity, or one person, as a saviour of sorts, who can cope with a variety of
challenges and can serve as a role model for us all. Hero worship is at the basis of
the major monotheist religions, and it has also informed the style of literature known
as ‘the epic’. The epic narrates the great achievements of one particular hero, such
as Homer’s Odysseus, and shuns the contribution of other protagonists. The epic of
international law obviously casts the state as the hero and minimizes—at least in its
traditional incarnation—the contributions of NSAs.
The epic was the dominant literary style in earlier times. However, it has been
largely overtaken by ‘the novel’, a style in which a variety of characters, and not just
one hero, play a role. Think, for instance, of Charles Dickens’s acclaimed novel ‘A
Tale of Two Cities’ (1859), set against the background of the French Revolution.3
This book has not one, but three main characters, a French aristocrat and a British
lawyer who falls in love with the Frenchman’s wife. While the Brit finally offers his
own life instead of the Frenchman’s on the gallows, the important takeaway is not
that the Brit is the hero, but that a variety of protagonists enter the stage. This speaks
to a reality of pluralism, with a number of rather different actors playing their part in
the story.
In literary theory, it is to his credit that the Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin
examined these genres of the epic and the novel, using the terms ‘monoglossia’ and
‘heteroglossia’—denoting respectively the one-person and multiple-person





narratives.4 Bakhtin has proved quite influential in semiotics, anthropology and
communication studies. However, recently his work has also been discovered by
scholars of law and governance, most notably by Mariana Valverde, a critical
theorist of scale and temporality who recently published the Bakhtin-inspired
Chronotopes of the Law.5 Valverde makes, inter alia, the point that the law,
including international law, is a monoglossia centred around the state and that it is
the task of the critical scholar to debunk myths of the state, and to find space for
non-state counter-narratives, or heteroglossia.
Let us be honest, debunking myths and imagining new realities is not the forte of
international lawyers steeped in the positivist tradition. We have been taught—and
we teach—that international law is what states make of it. We meekly refer and
defer to the list of sources of international law in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)—which all put the state at the centre of
attention. A critical scholar may however want to inquire why the state has cast such
a spell, and whether there are, or should be, juridical openings for NSAs within the
state system.
Historicizing the international legal system is a first step in this regard. We
should remember that imagining the body politic along territorial, state lines is the
result of a historically contingent confluence of a variety of material and epistemic
factors in the early modern period.6 Medieval times indeed presented us with a
heteroglossian social reality, with a variety of territorial and non-territorial actors
exercising power. Kings vied for power with local lords, with the Pope and with
cities whose merchants engaged in long-distance trade. Territorial, ‘state’ norms
existed alongside non-state norms, such as the lex mercatoria, canon law or the legal
practices of the guilds. Legal allegiances were not exclusive to the state but were
overlapping. In the 16th century, however, the emergence of the science of
cartography allowed secular rulers to draw more detailed boundaries, an event that
entrenched the power of the state and of territorial law. Branch’s (2013) narrative of
this historic trail is well worth reading in this regard.7
For our purposes, it is crucial to understand that the state gradually crowded out
non-state jurisdictional orders which could not easily be ‘mapped’ in the technical
sense of the word. The year 1648 is typically cited as a key moment; the Peace of
Westphalia, allegedly for the first time in history, defined the international
community as a community of states, endowed with full external and internal
sovereignty. This Peace did away with ‘transnational’ allegiances and incorporated
rights and properties within the territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty of the state.8
The heyday of the state would then follow in the 19th century, when a movement
emerged to channel nationalist sentiment through the territorial nation state.
4 Bakhtin (1981).
5 Valverde (2015).
6 E.g., Ruggie (1993).
7 Branch (2013). From a critical legal perspective: Ford (1999).
8 E.g., Art. LXXVI of the Peace of Westphalia (incorporating within the Kingdom of France, ‘with all




3 Heteroglossia: A Continuous Role for Non-State Actors
in the International System
While the state, with its monoglossian ambitions, has gradually entrenched its power
and captured legal and political scholars’ imagination, the reality of international life
has actually been different. Even in our post-16th century Modern Age, NSAs have
continued to play roles in international affairs.9 In the 17th century, the East India
Companies, while perhaps not fully operating independently from the state, wielded
enormous private economic power, having the monopoly on overseas trade with the
colonies. They can be considered as the precursors of the modern-day multinational
corporations.10 In the late 18th century, anti-slavery societies in the United Kingdom
and the United States started to militate against the slave trade, eventually
successfully. They can be considered as the first non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).11 In the 19th and early 20th century, peace movements were instrumental in
the establishment of arbitral tribunals and ultimately the League of Nations.12 At the
same time, women’s associations, attacking male-dominated state hierarchies,
managed to empower women—admittedly an ongoing struggle. And the 19th century
recognition of belligerency conferred a measure of legal personality on insurgents,
thereby foreshadowing the current legal international humanitarian law status of non-
state armed groups in non-international armed conflicts.
The World Court has also played its part in this respect. While the Court (in its
incarnations of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the ICJ) is
considered as a state-centred mechanism par excellence, it is recalled that its
recognition of NSAs’ legal status has not been marginal. In the 1928 Beamtenabkom-
men case, for instance, a case concerning the railway personnel of Danzig, the PCIJ
held that ‘the very object of an international agreement, according to the intention of
the contracting Parties, may be the adoption by the Parties of some definite rules
creating individual rights and enforceable by the national courts’.13 In so doing, it
confirmed that international law could create rights for individuals. Also, in two other
cases involving Poland, Minority Schools and German Settlers, the PCIJ ruled that the
object of a treaty (in the case the League of Nations’ Minority Treaties) could be the
protection of individual rights.14 Just after the Second World War, as is well known,
the newly established ICJ issued the famous Reparation advisory opinion, in which it
confirmed that there could be more subjects of international law than just states.15
9 I limit myself here to a brief overview of the role of NSAs in the European history/tradition of
international law, as European powers have arguably played a dominant role in the creation of modern
international law. See for a critical discussion Orakhelashvili (2006).
10 Robins (2012).
11 Martinez (2013).
12 Charnovitz (1996), p. 193.
13 PCIJ, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (The Beamtenabkommen), PCIJ Reports, Series B, No. 15.
14 PCIJ, Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Reports, Series A/B, No. 64; PCIJ,
Questions relating to Settlers of German Origin in Poland, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Reports, Series B,
No. 6.
15 ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 1949, p. 174.
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While the case concerned international organizations, its dictum could just as well
apply to other NSAs; they could be endowed with international legal personality
insofar as this would satisfy the needs of the international community, at least as so
perceived by states.
The term international legal person—although widely used in international law
circles, especially after the Reparation opinion—has little analytical purchase in
itself, however. It is not an a priori threshold that needs to be crossed before an NSA
can enjoy rights or obligations under international law. Rather, an NSA enjoys
international legal personality because it enjoys certain obligations. The focus of the
inquiry should thus simply be on whether an international norm creates rights or
obligations for an actor, and when this is indeed the case, the addressee of the norm
can be considered as an international legal person. Thus, when we say that an NSA
is a subject of international law, it simply means that it enjoys certain rights and/or
obligations under international law.
This brief overview shows us that the international legal system, as also further
developed by the World Court, has been more heteroglossian than meets the
untrained eye. There are, and may be, other subjects of international law than only
states, possessing international rights and obligations of a variable nature and scope.
It remains, however, that such rights and obligations are almost exclusively created
by states, albeit for NSAs. States thus remain the gatekeepers of the international
legal system; they decide who is in and who is out. A fine example is Article 71
United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Committee which
decides on the accreditation of NGOs with ECOSOC; this Committee is composed
of only states—a state of affairs which surely deserves criticism. So after all,
heteroglossia may be more imaginary than real. States, or states assembled in
international organizations, are still pulling the strings, and arguably only accept
NSAs insofar as these serve the purposes of the state or organization. As Kenneth
Anderson has pointed out, the UN has accepted NGOs with open arms to shore up
its own legitimacy (but as NGOs are lacking legitimacy themselves, this may come
down to a lovers’ embrace of death).16 States for their part have merrily supported
NGOs which serve as force multipliers for the state’s political agenda, with states
sometimes setting up their own government-organized NGOs (GONGOs).17 And
investors’ rights under international law have only been enhanced because
investors’ home states have concluded bilateral investment treaties containing
these very rights.
Small wonder, then, that some scholars have advocated taking heteroglossia
seriously, by giving primary agency to all international actors. The New Haven
School’s characterization of international law, as a process of authoritative
decision-making by a variety of interested actors rather than as a set of rigid
rules, is the most well known in this respect.18 This School does away with a formal
notion of international legal subjectivity and emphasizes how actors materially
participate in the creation of rules considered as authoritative although perhaps not
16 Anderson (2010).
17 Cumming (2010).
18 Lasswell and McDougal (1992).
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necessarily binding in an Article 38 ICJ Statute sense.19 Philip Jessup’s Transna-
tional Law also fits this mould; it collapses the distinction between the public and
the private and gives legal agency to all transnationally active actors.20
These truly heteroglossian approaches, while influential in critical scholarship,
have nevertheless failed to enter the mainstream. That being said, what is undeniable is
that a panoply of actors play in role in global governance. The term global governance
itself has even been invented to denote governance beyond the state: governance by, or
at least including, NSAs.21 What this means for legal normativity is another question,
however. We turn to this question in the next section.
4 The Role of Non-State Actors in Contemporary International Law-
Making, Compliance-Monitoring, and Dispute-Settlement
Most international lawyers with a positivist bent would not deny the important role
played by NSAs in the functioning of the current international legal system, but they
consider their impact on law-making, compliance-monitoring, and dispute-settle-
ment largely as the outcome of a two-level game.22 This means that NSAs do not
have a direct impact on international law-creation but they are free to influence the
actual law-making agencies: states. Law-applying agencies will normally not take
issue with how state or organizational authoritative decision-making has come into
being. A rare counter-example is ICJ Judges Guillaume and Oda’s criticism of the
UN General Assembly resolution requesting the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on
the use of nuclear weapons in 1996, on the ground that NGOs were behind this
resolution.23 However, by and large international law and its appliers black-box the
preference formation within states or international organizations.
Examples of how NSAs have influenced state preferences are not hard to come
by: just think of the outlawing of the slave trade in the 19th century, the creation of
the International Criminal Court, or the adoption of conventions on landmines and
cluster munitions. Article 71 of the UN Charter has even been explicitly adopted to
enable NGOs to impact on the policy-setting and norm-setting process within the
UN. Notably international relations scholars adhering to the constructivist school
have well theorized such norm cascades, consisting of local NGOs teaming up with
international NGOs so as to convince states or organizations to espouse civil society
values and/or bring pressure to bear on recalcitrant states.24
19 The term ‘participants’ is also used by Higgins (1994) and D’Aspremont (2011).
20 Jessup (1956).
21 Willetts (2010), pp. 144 et seq.
22 Raustiala (2012). I use the term ‘game’, drawing on game theory, an epistemic field that studies
conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers and that has namely been influential
in economics. Public international lawyers, especially in the United States, have recently relied on game
theory to explain the workings of international law. See, e.g., Posner (2010). This is obviously not to say
that the NSAs themselves consider their action to be a game.
23 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226,
Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, para. 2; ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, para. 8.
24 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).
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Whether NSAs can also play one-level games in international law-making and
policy-making is a different matter. Still, as a matter of positive law, it is hard to
deny the role played by employers’ and workers’ associations in the International
Labour Organization,25 the treaty-making practice of the Holy See,26 or the legal
value of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) agreements concluded
with states.27 It is a more controversial proposition, however, that agreements
concluded by armed opposition groups and states28 are governed by international
law, that the practice of NSAs counts towards the formation of customary
international law,29 or that transnational private regulation,30 or multi-stakeholder
initiatives31 can give rise to international obligations properly speaking. It is
doubtful whether we should allow NSAs to play even more one-level games, e.g.,
whether one should invite NGOs to the international negotiation table. Practical
problems and concerns over legitimacy militate against enhancing the law-making
capacities of NSAs.
NSAs have not only participated in international law-making games but have also
contributed or, more accurately, been allowed to contribute to monitoring
compliance with international law. NSA compliance-monitoring can be formal—
e.g. when it is provided for in a treaty or when NGO representatives form part of a
compliance or inspection committee—or informal, when NGOs simply name and
shame governments, armed groups, or corporations. It has a vertical dimension
where NGOs monitor state compliance and a horizontal one where NSAs monitor
other NSAs’ compliance without state mediation. The latter dimension is surely
innovative. The efforts of Geneva Call can be mentioned in this respect,32 as can the
role of NGOs in auditing corporations’ human rights record. Consumer and investor
pressure, e.g., the divestment regarding the fossil fuel industry,33 shows how market
forces can also enforce compliance with public values.34 The operation of the
market diminishes the role of the state in compliance-monitoring, as individuals no
25 International Labour Office, Note on the role of employers’ and workers’ organizations in the
implementation of ILO Conventions and Recommendations, 1987.
26 Ryngaert (2011).
27 Debuf (2015), pp. 327–329.
28 See, e.g., the agreement concluded between the Salvadorian Government and the Frente Farabundo
Marti para la Liberatio´n National (FMLN), generally referred to as the San Jose´ Agreement on human
rights, in which the FMLN agreed to comply with Common Art. 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions; the Humanitarian Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP), concluded on 2 June 2001; the Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)
to Protect Non-Combatant Civilians and Civilian Facilities from Military Attack, of 10 March 2002.
29 The ICRC believes, in any event, that it does not. See Henckaerts et al. (2005).
30 Cafaggi (2016).
31 See, e.g., the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, an initiative involving states, industry, and civil
society which ‘imposes extensive requirements on its members to enable them to certify shipments of
rough diamonds as ‘‘conflict-free’’ and prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate trade’. See
https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about, visited July 2016.
32 See http://www.genevacall.org, visited June 2016.
33 See http://gofossilfree.org/what-is-fossil-fuel-divestment/, visited June 2016.
34 See also Gal-Or et al. (2015).
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longer need to cast a ballot when they want politics to change; they can simply vote
with their shopping trolley or through their shareholder activism.
As far as NSA participation in dispute-settlement mechanisms is concerned, the
picture somewhat resembles the games played in law-making. Without the pressure
of discrete NSAs, some state-to-state contentious proceedings would not have been
brought, e.g., the Whaling case before the ICJ,35 or, in the case of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the majority of cases would
not have taken place.36 This is a two-level game, with states running errands for
influential NSAs. In contrast, opportunities for direct intervention by NSAs in
pending international law disputes are somewhat more circumscribed. The ICJ does
not allow such intervention, although, in advisory proceedings, states can refer to
written documents and statements submitted by NSAs to the Court.37 Trade and
investment tribunals, as well as domestic courts in some jurisdictions, may for their
part allow NGOs to file amicus curiae briefs in limited circumstances.38 A major
breakthrough in international law is obviously the creation of direct access rights for
NSA in some areas of international law—notably human rights and investment
law—which makes them no longer dependent on the mechanism of diplomatic
protection. Sometimes, states are also willing to conclude an arbitration agreement
with NSAs.39 Furthermore, as these days international law issues are being litigated
much more frequently in domestic courts, it is worth mentioning that NSAs
concerned about international issues may in some national jurisdictions have
standing to initiate proceedings single-handedly. For instance, in 2015, Dutch NGO
Urgenda successfully brought a case before a Dutch court against the Dutch
Government for failing to meet its international obligations to sufficiently reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.40 Also in 2015, the Polisario Front, a national liberation
movement fighting for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people in the Western
Sahara, was granted standing before the Court of Justice of the European Union
35 ICJ, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Merits, ICJ Reports
2014, p. 226. This case was brought by Australia against Japan partly as a result of pressure by
environmentalists. See ‘International Court of Justice orders Japan to End Antarctic Whaling’, Sydney
Morning Herald, 2 April 2014 (citing the backing of a legal solution by conservation groups including the
International Fund for Animal Welfare, since 2005).
36 Businesses which are affected by a foreign state’s trade restrictions have no other way than to lobby
their government to bring a case. This state of affairs has led to calls to give direct effect to WTO
obligations; this would allow the affected economic actors to bring a case, based on WTO law, in a
domestic legal order. See Ruiz Fabri (2014). See for that matter on the role of business pressure to create
the WTO in the first place: Aaronson (1996), p. 150 (writing that the Alliance for GATT NOW, which
was in existence during the Uruguay Round 1986–1994, had a membership of more than 200,000 small
and large businesses).
37 ICJ Practice Direction XII, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0, visited
June 2016.
38 On amicus curiae briefs before the WTO see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_
settlement_cbt_e/c9s3p1_e.htm, visited June 2016. On amicus curiae briefs before international invest-
ment tribunals see, e.g., Levine (2011).
39 See, e.g., Arbitration Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army on Delimiting Abyei Area, available at http://www.archive.pca-cpa.org/showpagefb0a.
html?pag_id=1306, visited June 2016.
40 See http://www.urgenda.nl/en/, visited June 2016.
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(EU) and successfully argued that an EU-Morocco free trade agreement violated the
right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people.41
5 Obligations and Responsibility of Non-State Actors
In the previous section, we discussed the (participatory) rights of NSAs in law-
making, compliance-monitoring, and dispute-settlement. An NSA’s international
legal personality is however also a function of the NSA bearing international
obligations, and having its international responsibility engaged. It should be
emphasized that this ‘debit side’ of legal personality does not necessarily correlate
with the ‘credit side’ of participatory rights; an NSA could well incur obligations
under a norm of international law, even if it has not participated in the formation of
that norm.42 Whether NSAs incur obligations under international law is, just like
with rights, a matter of construing the relevant international norm, typically made
by states.43 Accordingly, there is no general theory on NSA international
obligations; their scope and extent depend on the specific regime and the actor in
question.
Direct NSA obligations exist, but they are certainly not widespread. They exist
for armed groups under humanitarian law treaties44 and for deep seabed mining
corporations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.45 More often than
not, NSA obligations are just indirect: the treaty imposes obligations on states to
regulate NSAs.46 Such NSA obligations then arise under domestic rather than
international law. A normative or political question is whether extending such
obligations is desirable. As is known, a major debate has been going on regarding
whether corporations incur, or rather should incur, obligations under international
human rights law, with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
41 See Case T-512/12 Front populaire pour la libe´ration de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front
Polisario) v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 10 December 2015 (not yet published).
42 Although the absence of participation may create legitimacy/ownership/effectiveness problems. See
Ryngaert (2010). This absence of participation in law-making and the attendant compliance problems
have led Geneva Call to solicit unilateral acts from armed non-state actors in which they pledge to respect
certain rules of international humanitarian law.
43 Kjeldgaard-Pedersen (2012).
44 Common Art. 3, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva
Convention), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva
Convention), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth
Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3.
45 Art. 137 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 833 UNTS 3; [1994] ATS 31; 21 ILM
1261 (1982). See also Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in
the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011.




having settled the matter for non-legal duties.47 A similar debate is going on
regarding the human rights obligations of armed groups, although some scholars
claim that such obligations already exist as a matter of positive international law.48
Once obligations have been established, the subsequent question is whether
NSAs’ international responsibility can be engaged for violations of international
law. In early discussions within the NSA Committee of the International Law
Association, some members suggested to draw up draft articles along the lines of the
International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States and
International Organizations for Internationally Wrongful Acts. However, this idea
was abandoned because of the limited primary obligations of NSAs, the sheer
absence of relevant practice on responsibility, and the heterogeneity of the actors
involved. Aspects of responsibility—in particular attribution and reparations—have
so far mainly been theorized with respect to armed groups, e.g., can a terrorist act of
an Islamic State (IS) sympathizer be attributed to IS or is the FARC under an
obligation to make reparations to victims of its wrongful acts?49
6 Where Does This Leave the State?
The current legal landscape shows an empowerment of NSAs, a heteroglossian
reality, but where does it leave the initial hero in the story: the state? In fact, from an
international law perspective, the state can hardly be said to disappear. Firstly, NSA
rights and obligations under international law do not emerge ex nihilo; they are
granted by states, in their capacity as the quasi-exclusive law-makers in
international law. Second, the scope of states’ own obligations and rights is
expanding rather than contracting. The state has increased due diligence obligations
to ensure that NSAs over which it can exercise influence (e.g. corporations) comply
with international law—as the Guiding Principles have reminded us.50 Also, the
classic principles of the attribution of private acts to the state continue to apply.51
And to counter the threat posed by undesirable NSAs, states have carved out a legal
space to exercise self-defence not just against states but also against the NSAs
themselves, insofar as these have found a safe haven on another state’s territory.52
Similarly, states have pushed the boundaries of international humanitarian law to
justify the targeted killings of terrorist NSAs in a seemingly eternal war on terror.53
47 See United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011).
48 Fortin (2017, forthcoming).
49 See for a discussion the contributions on armed groups in Gal-Or et al. (2015).
50 See United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, supra n. 47.
51 Arts. 5-11 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November
2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10); Ryngaert (2015). It can even be argued that the threshold of
application of a number of attribution principles may have to be lowered, e.g., the effective control
standard in respect of terrorist offences. See Trapp (2015).
52 See, e.g., Szabo´ (2011), pp. 203–248.
53 See, e.g., with respect to the United States and Israel, Blum and Heymann (2010).
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From an international governance perspective, the state has similarly not
disappeared, but rather it has repurposed itself.54 The state may have abandoned
command and control regulation and may satisfy itself with orchestrating and
facilitating private initiative.55 For instance, states could support private, corporate
grievance mechanisms by setting minimum standards to be met, and to provide a
safety net when the private mechanism fails to deliver. This repurposing of the state
also plays out at the purely domestic level, e.g., in the Netherlands, where the
‘participation society’ has replaced the welfare state; for obvious financial reasons,
the state expects its citizens to care for themselves and their surroundings, while
offering enabling incentives.56 Ultimately, how much state and non-state gover-
nance we want is a political question; a smart mix of both may be desirable.
Let me finally flag that some autocratic jurisdictions do not seem to opt for such
an orderly retreat or repurposing of the state. Instead, they maintain, or even
strengthen their totalitarian ambitions.57 Also in multilateral settings, emerging
powers emphasize traditional principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention,
and they are wary of empowering civil society.58
7 Concluding Observations
I have shown in this brief article that the participation of NSAs in global governance
is a heteroglossian reality, even if the presence of the state continues to loom large.
International law or, more accurately, the community of states has responded in a
piecemeal fashion to this reality by conferring certain rights and obligations on
categories of NSAs. Whether this has been done adequately is a different question
altogether. I would venture to say that we do not need a world-scale theory to make
sense of the international legal personality of the generic category of ‘the non-state
actor’. Rather, a functionally differentiated legal regime tailored to the specific actor
and its activities is called for. Scholars may want to inquire whether the current and
envisaged regimes are sufficiently guided by the principles of legitimacy,
accountability, transparency, and effectiveness. Modesty is in the end also called
for. As international lawyers, we may have to resist the temptation to cast all
international social relationships in public international law terms or even in legal
terms to begin with. We should not exclude the possibility that transnational
regimes may function effectively via domestic regulation, non-state multi-
stakeholder regulation, or without any regulation whatsoever. However, where
these alternative regulatory solutions do not deliver, international law may well be
the default option.
54 See Sassen (2006).
55 E.g., Abbott et al. (2015).
56 Delsen (2012).
57 See as regards Russia, e.g., Zimmerman (2014).
58 See, e.g., Sceats and Breslin (2012).
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